for executive reorganization in I938 were an outgrowth of an awareness that a burgeoning and uncoordinated executive establishment was incompatible with the President's executive and legislative roles, among others. When Truman discovered that the counsels of some of his lieutenants in the executive establishment were compromising his role as chief executive, he confronted an almost classic role conflict among our chief executives.6 President Eisenhower's reluctance to "take on" Senator McCarthy was an attempt to minimize a conflict between his role as chief executive and his role as party leader.
The problem of role-integration in the Presidency is exacerbated by the variety of pressures that impinge upon the office.7
For each of the President's multiple roles a matching force in his immediate vicinity wanted him to concentrate on that one role and no other. The McAdoos, with their absorbing interest in California's federal judgeships, were duplicated in other persons whose absorbing interest was the farmer, or the laborer, or the big and little businessmen, or the ground forces, the naval forces, the air forces, the Latin Americans, the English, the Russians, the French, the Chinese, the enemy, the neutral powers, and on and on through all the list of things that make the globe.8
This variety of pressures has been more responsible than any other factor for the loose-jointed character of the President's relationships. The President's relationship with his own executive establishment is a struggle of executive program coordination against what Leiper Freeman has called "creeping pluralism."9 The President finds himself with expanding roles that are little more than opportunities to create the influence necessary to their fulfillment.
Presidents have certain techniques for resolving role-conflicts.10 One technique for resolving these jurisdictional conflicts is to erect a system of priorities. Thus, Roosevelt appeared to give greater weight to public approbation than he did to administrative "success." Agencies might be locked in overlapping struggles to the distraction of harassed administrators, yet FDR was inclined to regard this as secondary if the public received the program favorably. Role-conflicts may also be resolved by established "rules of the game" or, to use another phrase, "political etiquettes." The claim of a senator for a favored piece of patronage is such an etiquette that helps the President resolve rival patronage pressures. Role-conflicts may be resolved by tact and diplomacy. Presidential aides often serve as polite buffers. People are shunted aside, are given tactful dismissals and diplomatic "brush offs." 10Recently a colleague and this writer conducted an attitude analysis of expectations of leadership. A list of some fifty presidential role-conflict situations was compiled characteristic of the experiences of our recent Presidents. Some of these role-conflicts were simple ones between two roles. Others were multiple conflicts in which several areas of presidential competence were locked in critical choices. The study is forthcoming.
Role-segregation is another method. Thus, Eisenhower, to a greater extent than any previous President, has delegated his duties to particular cabinet members and to members of his staff. The President thereby relieves himself of the pressures of one of his roles. Among other familiar techniques that our Presidents have employed are the following: playing off one group against another to mitigate clashing demands of each; "stalling" until the pressure subsides; resolving conflicts by redefining roles; leading a "double life." To sum up, there are more or less institutionalized techniques for preventing or diminishing role-conflicts."1 Nonetheless, the dynamics of presidential roles proceed at a faster rate than the techniques for their management.
Role-conflicts are characteristic in the unintegrated system that are presidential relationships. The power of the President rests upon and takes place within certain institutionalized frameworks, but presidential influence, in contrast to presidential power, is something the President himself must create. Within the circumference of historical expectations of presidential conduct, there are wide areas where the grooves of behavior are ambiguous. In this area, the President is free to carve out for himself, through his perceptions of his role and the practical limits of political consensus, the paths he chooses to follow. "To get any kind of measure enacted, the President has to build a special coalition for the immediate object in view. Sometimes he can do this by reshuffling the forces within his party. He can also pick up support from among the dissidents in the opposition, or he can appeal directly to the nation in the hope that its groundswells will override all party lines."l2 The President's role as a party leader is, thus, at the hub of his other roles.
A salient characteristic of these presidential roles is the extent to which their fulfillment is contingent upon the activities of a staff and a burgeoning Executive Office.l3 This office has been a product of the expanding roles of the President and an important instrument for their integration. For, to a large measure, the President imparts to his office his particular interpretation of the Presidency. The Presidency today is an increasingly organizational product to which many contribute. The processes we call presidential action are distilled from a myriad of organized activities, formal and informal. We wish to discuss some aspects of the party leadership role in this new organized face of the Presidency. gram and administrative impact of the presidential party we have described.26 Collectively, these new agencies represent an effort to raise to the highest level broad policy considerations,27 where the President may use his influence over Congress, his party, or the people as a whole. "It is the power that lodges at low points in the executive hierarchy that is hardest to bring to light and hold effectively accountable"28 and where interest groups may enjoy their widest play.
THE PRESIDENT AND THE DECENTRALIZED PARTY
Not long ago, the delineation of our party system followed a familiar model.2 The model was described in the following terms. The base of power in our parties was in the states and localities. On this level, the political party was a political machine organized hierarchically with a boss at its apex. The President and national party apparatus played subordinate roles.
The changes of the past two decades have threatened this model with obsolescence. There is a closure of the traditional gaps among state, local, and federal governments. In a myriad of ways, some controlled and others uncontrolled, a creeping nationalization has been taking place. The dynamic balance between state, local, and federal government is being constantly altered. In this process, presidential action has been both cause and effect. The impact of executive sponsored statutes and executive administrative decisions of recent decades in making local matters of national concern, and vice versa, is too obvious to repeat. A significant technique employed by the President is the appeal to the public as a whole. So fluid has been our party discipline and identification that, paradoxically, the appeal by the President as a national leader is a major technique for party discipline in Congress and in the states. In recent years, with the mounting evidence of economic and cultural nationalization, this leadership technique has special meaning. It is a way whereby the President may exploit national consensus, sharpened by cold war tensions, to offset the particularism of legislators, while weakened party organization and party identifications by the electorate38 can erect fewer defenses against it.
THE PRESIDENT "ABOVE" PARTY
One of the dilemmas of the Presidency is that it is a position with two mandates, one from a political party and another from the public-at-large. The fact that each mandate is ambiguous creates at once leadership opportunities and complications.
The President's political party is at least nominally committed to mobilizing its adherents on his behalf. The presidential electorate is always broader than the steadfast party supporters.39 In recent years, the presidential electorate has become more fluid.40 The tides in voting behavior from Roosevelt through Eisenhower have been variously analyzed. The social mobility in the postwar era to which we have previously alluded has done much to dilute previous long standing group identifications.
Our recent Presidents, armed with newer weapons of mass communication, have relied on methods that bypass party structures and appeal directly to the electorate. All of our recent Presidents have found these methods efficacious. It is no exaggeration to say that the President's most influential role and skill has become that of a public communicator.41 The technological revolution in the mass media-press, radio, and television-coupled with the sophistication and professionalization of insights into mass persuasion, have made possible an intensified relationship between the President and the public. The organized character of this relationship is one of the notable features of our politics. "President Roosevelt seems to have been the first President . . . to establish and utilize systematically and continuously an elaborate organization designed to gauge public sentiment and world public opinion."42 Because these set a pattern that other Presidents followed, they are worthy of greater attention.
Like no much against his will, the President is suddenly being presented as the answer and solution to everything-war, juvenile delinquency, the decline in farm prices, parental irresponsibility, the division of Europe and Germany, polio, death on the highways, the school shortage and the rest. When the Republican state chairmen met here this week, they went over all these things and came to the same conclusion about everything. Ike was the answer.
This technique has served to make the President a person "above" party. However, such elevation pushes party responsibility farther beyond reach. If the Presidency relies too heavily on popular appeal, then party organization necessarily becomes subordinated and weakened. We see, then, the trend toward the "personalization" of the Presidency as a threat to party organization.
This new dimension of presidential influence has opened a direct channel to party adherents in the electorate that circumvents party organization. The middleman of party organization is being displaced by the direct communication possible between the President and informal opinion leaders in the community who hold no party posts. Frank Hague, in his days of power, reputedly once said that "Franklin D. Roosevelt was the best precinct captain that he had." Hague's remark pithily illustrates the point. The President can, through mass appeal, awaken and foster new groups of party activists who oppose existing party organization. A recent analysis of the Republican Party in Michigan describes the factional conflict that has served to weaken the party.51 The factional splits revolve around a new "self-starting" element that has arisen out of the intense "followership" of President Eisenhower. These Eisenhower zealots challenged the existing organization and are still locked in struggle with it.
Perhaps the most striking paradox of this new dimension of presidential influence is that it has grown simultaneously with the President's efforts and success in crystallizing national issues for public debate. There is a fine line, easily traversed, between public education on issues and demagogic appeals. The power of the mass media makes possible the projection of many types of address. Which aspect of a message is most salient is partly a matter of audience predisposition and its environment, and the purposes of the communicator. There are serious dangers when, through mass manipulation, false expectations of leadership are generated.
We have attempted to place the President's party leadership role in the context of its dynamic relationship to the President's other roles. We have considered the growth in presidential influence as it has been augmented by the presidential party in the executive, changes in state and local party organizations, and through enhanced public response.
